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Abstract: The Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection has long been 
troubled by the issue of personal identity, but prior to the advent of such 
concerns there existed a cognate concern about the identity not of the 
resurrected person, but of the resurrected person’s body. Although this latter 
issue has exercised scholars of various ages, concern with it was particularly 
keen in early modern times. In this paper I chart the various ways bodily 
identity was conceived by early modern thinkers in connection with the 
resurrection, as well as the key objections their contemporaries developed in 
response. 
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Introduction 
It is well-known that the Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection, that 
is, the belief that all human beings will one day be resurrected by God, has long been 
troubled by the issue of personal identity. Concern over how a person can retain his or 
her identity in the resurrection, given the apparent break in psychological continuity 
between death and revivification, has existed since the time of Locke, and continues 
to exercise contemporary philosophers and theologians. Yet prior to the advent of 
such concerns about personal identity there existed a cognate concern about the 
identity not of the resurrected person, but of the resurrected person’s body. To 
understand why there should have been such a concern, it is important to recognize 
that, notwithstanding the vision of bodiless souls engendered by Cartesian 
metaphysics, the Judaeo-Christian tradition has customarily considered humans to be 
– and only ever be – embodied, corporeal beings, usually some sort of unified 
composite of body and soul, one upshot of which is that representatives of this 
tradition have understood ‘resurrection’ to mean a bodily resurrection rather than a 
revival of a disembodied soul.1 This was and still is a popular belief, especially among 
Christians. Many of the early church fathers, such as Athenagoras,2 Justin Martyr,3 
Rufinus,4 Tertullian,5 and Methodius,6 promoted the belief that all would one day 
experience a bodily resurrection. This doctrine was later endorsed by the Fourth 
Lateran Council, enshrined in the Apostles’ Creed, and taught by both Luther and 
Calvin.7 With such patronage, it is hardly surprising that the belief that humans will 
undergo a bodily resurrection remained a popular one throughout medieval, 
renaissance and early modern times, its popularity only starting to wane to any 
significant degree in the last two centuries.8 
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     Now in and of itself, the belief in a bodily resurrection has not been, historically, 
an especially problematic one for the Judaeo-Christian tradition, since the religions of 
this tradition all posit the existence of a God whose power and knowledge are so vast 
(maximally so, according to some) that the task of effecting a bodily resurrection of 
humans seems no more difficult – indeed, much less difficult – than some of the other 
things this God is often credited with, such as creating the universe ex nihilo. So if 
those belonging to the Judaeo-Christian tradition had simply stated their belief that the 
resurrection would be a bodily one, arguably the doctrine would not have caused its 
adherents to have any serious philosophical misgivings about it.9 But many of the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition held it to be true, and in some cases as even an article of 
faith, that humans would not only experience a bodily resurrection, but would actually 
be resurrected with the same bodies possessed during normal life.10 Scriptural 
passages were often cited in defence of this view, but many also stressed that, unless 
humans receive the same body they had when alive, their revivification could scarcely 
be termed a resurrection in the first place.11 So to many, the very idea of a bodily 
resurrection presupposed that it will be the same bodies that are brought back. Some 
also argued that humans would be resurrected with the same bodies because justice 
required it: in the Judaeo-Christian tradition it was a common belief that body and 
soul were equal partners in all of a person’s actions, nefarious or otherwise, so in 
order that rewards and punishments be meted out fairly the wicked must be punished 
in the same bodies in which they did their sinning, and the good rewarded in the same 
bodies in which they performed their good deeds. It was often stated that it would be 
as unjust to reward or punish a soul for things it had taken no part in as it would to 
reward or punish a body for deeds it had not performed.12 
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     For various reasons, then, the belief that humans are to be resurrected with the 
same body has been very common among those of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. 
Unsurprisingly, the chief question raised by this belief was this: what exactly does it 
mean to be resurrected with ‘the same body’? The prima facie difficulty with 
providing a satisfactory answer to this question is not hard to fathom, since the 
diachronic identity of a physical thing has traditionally been thought to be secured by 
some kind of continuity, whether through space and time or through its constituent 
parts. But as it is not self-evident that either kind of continuity can be maintained 
through a body’s cycle of life-death-decomposition-resurrection, it is by no means 
clear how a person’s resurrected body can be said to be the same as the one that 
person had during normal life. 
     Although the question of what it means to be resurrected with the same body has 
exercised scholars of various ages, it would be fair to say that concern with it was 
particularly keen in early modern times, when it was the subject of fierce debates 
which blotted almost as much paper as those surrounding the cognate concern of 
personal identity. As Catharine Trotter correctly noted, thinkers of the early modern 
period interpreted the term ‘same body’ in very different ways in the context of the 
resurrection,13 a fact which has led one modern scholar to remark that ‘the very notion 
of sameness was soaked in ambiguity’.14 The aim of this paper will be to 
disambiguate this notion by charting the various ways bodily identity was conceived 
by early modern thinkers, as well as the key objections their contemporaries 
developed in response. Documenting this debate will not only contribute much to our 
understanding of early modern thinking at the interface between metaphysics and 
eschatology,15 but will also give some useful background and context to contemporary 
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efforts to develop a satisfactory notion of what it means to be resurrected with the 
same body.16 
     Before our examination begins, it is worth noting that while some early moderns 
felt able to consider the question of bodily identity independently of any other 
considerations, others saw the issue as overshadowed by two further matters. First, 
there was the wider issue of what it means to say that a body remains the same over 
time during normal life, given the long-recognized fact that the parts of a human body 
are in constant flux. Second, and more importantly, there was the issue raised by 
anthropophagi, that is, by cannibal activity. Although two versions of the so-called 
‘cannibal problem’ have been formulated, the one that most exercised early modern 
thinkers is this one, in the words of an English divine: 
 
it will be said, that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the same body is 
absurd and impossible; because it may happen, that the body of one man, or part 
of it, may be devoured by another man; and so by eating and digesting it may 
become the body, or part of the body of another man; so that at the resurrection, 
the same body can't belong to both, and that the parts that one hath, the other 
must be defective in.17 
 
It is worthwhile noting that, in spite of light-hearted treatments of the cannibal 
problem in contemporary literature,18 it was taken very seriously by early modern 
thinkers, not least because the problem is in fact more acute than might first appear. 
For as was often pointed out, there is a sense in which all of us are (or at least 
potentially might be) cannibals, on account of the ‘subtle Cookery of Nature’, to use 
Humphrey Hody’s felicitous phrase.19 That is, the matter belonging to the bodies of 
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deceased humans may enter into the bodies of others via a more indirect route than 
straightforward cannibalism, since the remains of human bodies sometimes nourish 
plants and animals, which in turn may be eaten by other humans. Considered in this 
way, the problem of the ownership of bodily matter highlighted by the cannibal 
problem potentially applies to everyone, not just those who intentionally ingest human 
flesh. Nevertheless, in what follows I shall continue to refer to the objection as the 
cannibal problem. 
     With these considerations in mind, we turn now to the early modern accounts of 
what it means to be resurrected with the same body, of which I count no fewer than 
eight. 
 
Raising the body as it was when it died 
The first of these accounts is this:  
 
RB1 (= Resurrection Body 1). A person’s resurrected body will consist of all 
and only those bits of matter of which that person’s body was composed at the 
point of death. 
 
This account was very popular with the church Fathers,20 and was still being endorsed 
in early modern times by English divines like William Lupton,21 John Pearson,22 and 
William Wilson.23 Proponents of this account, including all three aforementioned 
divines, often cited certain passages of Scripture in support of it, for instance Matthew 
27.52-3 and John 5.28, which refer to the dead rising from their graves, and 
Revelation 20.13, which refers to the sea giving up its dead. The interpretation of 
these passages favoured by Lupton, Pearson, and Wilson was that it is the body as it 
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was when it died which is to be brought back, such that the resurrected body of each 
individual is mathematically or numerically identical with that individual’s body as it 
was when the individual died.24 No doubt satisfied by what were perceived to be its 
solid scriptural credentials, proponents of RB1 generally did not attempt to make a 
philosophical case for their chosen view, though it is easy to see how they could have 
done. After all, RB1 entails that there will be material continuity (that is, continuity of 
constituent materials) between resurrection and pre-resurrection bodies, and such 
continuity is often considered sufficient to ground claims of identity. For instance, a 
watch which is disassembled and its parts scattered about a workshop may, it is often 
said, be the very same watch once again if its parts are gathered together again and 
arranged as they were prior to its disassembly.25 As Lupton, Pearson, and Wilson 
envisage the same thing occurring with human bodies at the resurrection, it seems 
they have a prima facie defensible conception of how resurrection and pre-
resurrection bodies can be deemed the same. 
     Despite the aforementioned advantages, RB1 did not find favour with many early 
modern thinkers and was subjected to a variety of objections. For instance, Samuel 
Bold wrote: 
 
Those who assert [the necessity of our being resurrected with all those particles 
and only those particles which our bodies contained when they died] have 
provided such a Necessary Article for all Christians to believe, as no Man can in 
an ordinary way know is True. Yea, which (if it is an Article of Christian Faith) 
will render it impossible for any Man after the Resurrection, to know that he is 
the same Man or Person he was formerly: for seeing he is absolutely ignorant 
of, and cannot know the Numerical Particles his Body did consist of, when laid 
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in the Grave; and cannot by this Article be the same Man or Person, unless his 
Body do consist just of the same Numerical Particles that Body did consist of, 
which was laid in the Grave, he will never be able to know, or be strictly 
certain, that he is the very same Man or Person which formerly lived in the 
World.26 
 
To the best of my knowledge, no adherent of RB1 ever formulated a response to 
this epistemological objection. But then it is doubtful that they would need to, 
since the objection is applicable to many other definitions of ‘same body’, as will 
become clear over the course of the paper. 
     A much greater worry for adherents of RB1 came in the form of the cannibal 
problem. Samuel Drew suggested that RB1 is ill-equipped to tackle the cannibal 
problem because for all to be resurrected with the same body as defined by RB1, it 
would have to be the case that no one die while containing any matter from the body 
of another person, a scenario apparently ruled out by the exploits of cannibals.27 So 
how did adherents of RB1 respond to the cannibal problem? The short answer is: they 
didn’t. For instance, William Lupton did not mention the cannibal problem at all in 
his sermon on the resurrection. Nor did John Pearson in his lengthy discussion of the 
same subject. And William Wilson states very firmly in his large treatise on the 
resurrection that he will ‘not examine those curious Questions, with which vain Men 
endeavour to perplex this Doctrine’.28 It would be rash to speculate on the motives 
behind Lupton’s, Pearson’s, and Wilson’s decision not to address the cannibal 
problem, but had they attempted to do so it is likely they would have quickly realized 
how little room for manoeuvre was afforded them by their endorsement of RB1. 
Indeed, in order to show that it is possible for all to be resurrected with the same body 
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as defined by RB1, Lupton, Pearson, and Wilson would need to show that no two 
human bodies will contain the same bit of matter at their respective times of death. 
Interestingly, the early modern period was awash with theories that could serve to do 
just this. For instance, John Edwards, Anthony Fleury, and Bernard Nieuwentijt 
suggested that there was no proof that human flesh is actually assimilable by other 
humans.29 François Feller went one step further and argued that human flesh is not 
assimilable by its very nature,30 while Hugo Grotius and Robert D’Oyly claimed that 
it is not assimilable because of God’s intervention, i.e. whenever one person is eaten 
by another, God intervenes to ensure that no part of the former’s body ever becomes 
part of the latter’s.31 Another alternative was put forward by Humphrey Hody, who 
claimed that while human flesh is assimilable, in the event that parts of one person’s 
body found their way into the body of another, God will intervene to ensure that the 
latter did not die until the parts of the eaten person had passed out of the system of the 
cannibal.32 The adoption of one or other of these theories may have enabled adherents 
of RB1 to neutralise the cannibal problem, though arguably the extra baggage would 
not have made RB1 more plausible to most early modern thinkers, especially given 
the relatively widespread belief that human flesh is assimilable by other humans. 
 
Stillingfleet’s ‘true and real parts’ 
It is notable that while belief in ‘the resurrection of the same body’ was almost 
unanimous in early modern times, most of those who expressed an opinion on the 
matter flatly denied RB1, and it is no less notable that those who did deny RB1 
generally did so with one eye on the cannibal problem, the force of which seems to 
have convinced numerous thinkers that humans are not necessarily resurrected with 
numerically the same bits of matter their bodies had at the point of death. The 
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following interpretation of ‘the resurrection of the same body’ is a case in point; 
found in the work of Edward Stillingfleet, that erstwhile disputant of Locke, it was 
developed with the threat of the cannibal problem very much in mind. Stillingfleet 
claims that: 
 
If a Man lives to thirty or forty years, his Body hath undergone many new 
Repairs in that time, and all the old Materials were as true and real parts of the 
Body, as the new ones, and yet it is the same Body, in the sense of all 
Mankind.33 
 
The moral Stillingfleet draws from this is that as long as a person’s resurrection body 
is composed of bits of matter that were at one time or another parts of that person’s 
body during normal life (i.e. were ‘true and real parts’ of that person’s body), then 
that person can be said to be resurrected with the same body. He offers two examples 
to bolster his case; one involves a victim of cannibalism, the other ‘a corpulent Man’ 
who dies anything but corpulent, having fallen victim to consumption. In the case of 
the cannibal victim, Stillingfleet supposes that the parts eaten by the cannibal will not 
be returned to the victim, but that this will not result in any deficiency in the victim’s 
resurrection body because the missing parts will be made up with bits of matter which 
were part of the victim’s body before the cannibal struck. In the case of the 
consumption victim, Stillingfleet suggests that it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
he will be resurrected with all the parts his body had just before the consumption 
really took hold. In both cases, Stillingfleet thinks that the resurrection bodies will be 
considered the same as the ones the two individuals had during normal life. 
Stillingfleet’s view thus amounts to this: 
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RB2. A person’s resurrected body will consist of bits of matter which were parts 
of that person’s body at some point during normal life. 
 
Although it is not explicit, in formulating RB2 Stillingfleet seems to ground the 
identity of resurrection and pre-resurrection bodies on the fact that there is material 
continuity between the two, in that the former only consists of bits of matter which 
were once part of the latter. Yet such a manoeuvre did not convince Samuel Drew, 
who argued that RB2 contains at least one barely-concealed absurdity, which is that 
‘there may be as many distinct identities, as there are parts which are capable of 
constituting them’. Drew’s point, which is scarcely clear from this brief summary, 
draws its force from the fact that, during normal life, a person’s body is composed of 
different bits of matter at different times. This means that there will be a relatively 
large quantity of matter which, on RB2, will qualify as ‘true and real parts’ of that 
person’s body. Drew then supposes that God fashions a person’s resurrection body by 
indiscriminately selecting from the bits of matter which once formed part of that 
person’s body; according to RB2, the resultant resurrection body will be the same as 
the one that person had during normal life. Drew then points out that the bits of matter 
‘inhering in the body...when it dropped into the grave, will have the same right’, i.e. 
will also have the right, according to RB2, to be deemed ‘the same body’ as that 
person had during normal life. The upshot, writes Drew, is that ‘This second number 
may also constitute another identity of the same body, and we shall then have two 
identities of the same body, which is an absurdity that surpasses, if possible, a 
palpable contradiction.’34 According to Drew, however, the situation is even worse 
than that; instead of licensing two ‘identities of the same body’, RB2 licenses a 
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countless number, since there are countless possible arrangements of ‘true and real 
parts’ of a person’s body, each of which will give rise to ‘the same body’. Drew thus 
offers what he takes to be a reductio of RB2, namely that it allows different bits of 
matter in different arrangements to be termed the same. 
 
The body raised as it was in any period of life 
A variation of RB2 is to be found in other thinkers, such as Samuel Chandler, who 
writes: 
 
...it is no more necessary to the constituting the same body, that it should be the 
body we have today...than that it should be the body we had twenty years ago, 
or the body we may have the same number of years hereafter... The restoration 
of that body that we had in any period of life, may be sufficient to give it the 
denomination of the same body.35 
 
Chandler here supposes that a person’s resurrected body will feature the very same 
bits of matter that together composed her body at some particular point during life. 
So on Chandler’s view, a person may be resurrected with the very same bits of 
matter her body had at the age of twenty, or at thirty, or at any other age. We can 
summarize Chandler’s view as follows: 
 
RB3. A person’s resurrected body will consist of all and only those bits of 
matter which together composed that person’s body at some point during that 
person’s life. 
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In advancing RB3, Chandler presumably intends to secure the identity of a person’s 
resurrection body and pre-resurrection body on the fact that there will be material 
continuity between them (or rather, continuity between the resurrection body, and the 
pre-resurrection body as it was at one particular time). Moreover, RB3 is framed in 
such a way as to defend the possibility of a universal resurrection against the cannibal 
problem. For RB3 allows victims of cannibalism to be resurrected with the matter 
their bodies had prior to being eaten, and/or cannibals to be resurrected with the 
matter their bodies had prior to becoming cannibals. So no one need go short at the 
resurrection; cannibals and victims alike may be resurrected with the same body (as 
defined by RB3), together with everyone else. Given its apparent success in resolving 
the cannibal problem, it is perhaps surprising that RB3 was not advanced more often. 
Its apparent lack of popularity cannot be traced to any critical onslaught it received 
either, as no such onslaught occurred. To a large extent this may have been due to the 
relative obscurity of the works in which it appeared. For instance, we can only assume 
that in framing his objection to RB2, Samuel Bold was unaware of RB3, because his 
objection surely applies to the latter as well as the former. For it seems clear enough 
that God could, if he so desired, resurrect the body of a person as it was at the age of 
ten, or at the age of twenty, or at the age of thirty and so on, each of which would 
have an equal right to be deemed ‘the same body’, according to RB3, despite each 
differing in terms of material content and arrangement. And as this is precisely the 
corollary Bold found so absurd with RB2, it is safe to suppose that he would have had 
no greater sympathy toward RB3, had he known of it. 
 
The introduction of new matter 
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Another suggestion touted in the early modern period of how to understand the 
‘resurrection of the same body’ can be found in the writings of Winch Holdsworth, 
who outlines his view as follows: 
 
the same humane Bodies which were Born, Liv’d and Dy’d, Distinct from all 
others, shall at the last Day, by an Almighty Power, be Restor’d to the same 
Principle of Individuation; God, according to his good Pleasure, Restoring from 
the several Lodgments of Nature, a sufficient Quantity of the Materials of the 
Old, to which such New Matter, as He sees fit, may be Added, or Not.36 
 
But why would God, when fashioning a person’s resurrection body, bring together 
some materials which were formerly part of that person’s body, and add to them some 
other materials that never were? An answer can be found in the work of another 
proponent of Holdsworth’s view, John Edwards: 
 
The Flesh of Man, devoured by another and become (as we now suppose) his 
Flesh, can be restored by God to him whose Flesh it was at first: God can repair 
the Man-Eater’s Body either by creating new Matter, or by taking something 
from other Bodies that are not Humane.37 
 
Both Edwards and Holdsworth appear to hold that God will seek to resurrect each 
body with the same numerical bits of matter it had when it died,38 but the fact that this 
will not be possible in some cases – specifically those in which there is a problem of 
ownership thanks to the exploits of anthropophagi – seems to have been in no small 
way responsible for them formulating their conception of ‘the same body’ which 
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allows for the introduction of new matter where necessary. The suggestion put 
forward by both Edwards and Holdsworth can be summarized as follows: 
 
RB4. A person’s resurrected body will consist of all and only those bits of 
matter of which that person’s body was composed at the point of death, or, if 
this is not possible, then it will consist of as many such bits of matter as are 
available, together with some new bits of matter which were previously not part 
of that person’s body at all. 
 
But why should it be thought that cannibals are resurrected with the same bodies, 
given that their resurrection bodies consist of some of the matter possessed by their 
bodies at the time of death along with some matter which had never before been part 
of them? Holdsworth explains that, in normal life, human bodies are subject to a 
constant ebb and flow of materials – some bits of matter are added, while other bits 
are lost – without it ever ceasing to be the case that each body is the same. In 
Holdsworth’s view, it follows from this that the introduction of new matter does not 
deleteriously affect the diachronic identity of a human body, and so God can 
introduce new matter to a person’s resurrection body without thereby destroying its 
identity. Many early modern thinkers were generally sympathetic to the first part of 
this argument, namely that the introduction of new matter does not deleteriously 
affect the diachronic identity of a human body during normal life, but concerns were 
raised over the second part. Robert D’Oyly, for instance, argued that the introduction 
of ‘foreign matter’ into a person’s resurrection body would undercut the core idea that 
what is brought back in the resurrection is something that was once alive: ‘nothing 
can be said to be Dead but what once had Life, and is now deprived of it; which 
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cannot, without the most palpable Falshood, be said, either of the Soul, or a Body 
consisting of foreign Matter’.39 To seal his critique, D’Oyly claimed that RB4 also 
undermines the broader notion that resurrection involves a bringing back of 
something that existed before: ‘the proper Notion of a Resurrection as here 
understood imports only the recovery, or raising again of a Body corrupted, into its 
former State’.40 Implicit here is the requirement that, to qualify as a resurrection at all, 
it must be the same body that is returned; D’Oyly also assumes that any resurrection 
body incorporating ‘foreign matter’ does not qualify as ‘the same’. So if, as licensed 
by RB4, a cannibal’s resurrection body includes some ‘foreign matter’, then 
according to D’Oyly it cannot be ‘the same body’ and hence cannot be said to have 
been resurrected at all. 
 
Seeds and cores 
The inclusion of foreign matter in a resurrection body was also endorsed by, or at 
least permitted by, our fifth response to the question of how humans retain the same 
bodies in the resurrection. Very popular in the early modern period, this response 
borrows heavily, as many of its proponents acknowledged, from 1 Corinthians 15. 
There, St Paul notes that, in the case of wheat, what is sown is not wheat itself but 
rather a seed, with God giving a body to every seed. The vague analogy that many 
saw here between human bodies and wheat was subsequently enriched by a doctrine 
drawn from 17th century alchemy, namely that the seed of a plant lives on even when 
the rest of the plant dies, and is in fact indestructible (proved, it was often thought, by 
the fact that a plant burned to ashes later grows again).41 The combination of St Paul 
and alchemical thinking gave rise to the view that every human body has an 
‘essential’ seed or core which remains with it throughout the whole of its life and 
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stays intact after death. Moreover, the durable core was thought to be the source of a 
body’s identity, such that irrespective of whichever ‘accidental’ bits of matter it 
happened to be joined at any given time, the resulting body was always the same one 
(as any and all changes that a body underwent were merely to its accidental features, 
not to the essential core). According to this theory, then, all God needs to do to bring 
everyone back with the same body is locate the essential core of each body and build 
it back up with whatever bits of matter he likes. This view can be summed up as 
follows: 
 
RB5. A person’s resurrected body will consist of some kind of essential core, 
which remains numerically the same core that person’s body had during life, 
together with other bits of matter of which the latter may or may not have been 
composed during life. 
 
But what, we might ask, is this ‘essential’ core? To this question we find a 
bewildering variety of answers. Robert Boyle famously identified the bones as being 
the obvious candidate, partly on account of a passage from Ezekiel (37.7-8) which 
tells of the bones of the dead being raised up and furnished with new sinews (which 
Boyle took to mean skin, nerves, tendons and ligaments),42 and partly because his 
own experiments had shown that human bones were ‘of a stable and lasting texture’, 
and ‘not apt to be destroyed by the operation either of earth or fire’.43 Despite Boyle’s 
status, his view was not without its critics. Even John Tillotson, an Anglican 
archbishop and therefore presumably not in the same league as Boyle on scientific 
matters, was aware that the bones are not stable features of the human body ‘because 
they grow, and whatever grows is nourish’d and spends’.44 This fact was clearly 
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unknown to Humphrey Hody who identified, like Boyle, the bones as ‘integrant and 
necessary Parts’, but to them added ‘the Skin, the Nerves, the Tendons, the Ligaments, 
and the Substance of the several Vessels’.45 According to Hody, as long as these 
remained, then a body was truly whole, and could be built up again with new material 
while still retaining its identity. 
     But these were not the only suggestions as to what constitutes the essential core of 
the body. Both Bernard Nieuwentijt and Charles Drelincourt suggested that it is the 
bones and nerves,46 while Henry Felton opted for the ‘Solid parts, the Substratum, 
that supports the Accidents’,47 (though what exactly that is he did not say). Samuel 
Johnson, whose forays into philosophy apparently extended beyond kicking stones in 
an attempt to refute Berkeley, claimed that in every human body there is ‘a certain 
Stamen, a Root, a Principle, or Seed of Life’,48 and the survival of this guaranteed the 
identity of the body. Johnson, however, neglected to mention which part of the human 
body qualified as this vital ‘stamen’. And in this he was not alone. Samuel Drew 
refused to be drawn on ‘the dimensions, the texture, the configuration, and the place 
of residence’ of what he termed the body’s ‘immovable matter’.49 The naturalist 
Joseph Priestley spoke of an essential ‘stamina’ or ‘germ’,50 a view he cheerfully 
admitted he had lifted from the philosopher Isaac Watts, who had in fact been a bit 
more forthcoming in arguing that the core of the body is its ‘essential and constituent 
Tubes, Fibres or staminal Particles’ which were to be found especially in the bowels 
and bones.51 
     Although proponents of RB5 disagreed on which part(s) of the body qualified as 
its essential core, most were of the view that it was indigestible, i.e. not assimilable 
into other human bodies (which thus neutralised the threat posed by the cannibal 
problem) and/or indestructible,52 though supporting evidence for this claim was 
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typically not provided. Yet the lack of evidence for the oft-claimed 
indigestibility/indestructibility of the body’s essential core was not the biggest 
concern among critics of RB5, which instead focused on the broad suggestion that the 
identity of a person’s resurrected body is secured by the recovery of its essential core 
to which other bits of matter can then be added. ‘For this is not to assert’, wrote 
William Wilson, ‘a Resurrection of the same Body, but only of some small part of 
it’.53 Locke made a similar point: if the identity of human bodies is secured by the 
identity of some kind of ‘seminal part’ contained within them, then this seminal part 
alone must be judged the same thing as the seminal part joined to one other particle of 
matter, or a thousand, or a million. Thus on this view, Locke notes, ‘a Body may be 
enlarged by the addition of a Hundred or a Thousand times as much bulk as its own 
matter, and yet continue the same Body, which I confess, I cannot understand’.54 Even 
Humphrey Hody, a proponent of RB5, saw this fault in versions of the essential core 
doctrine other than his own; after outlining Boyle’s claim that the bones alone were 
essential for bodily resurrection, Hody wrote: ‘This is not to defend the Doctrine of 
the Resurrection, but to give it up to it’s Adversaries, and to advance another Doctrine 
instead of it. For it is not true that a Body so made up, may be call’d the same with 
that which died.’55 
 
The flower of substance and ‘little ethereal machine’ 
The idea of an indestructible essential core also appeared under a different guise in 
the early modern period, in the youthful writings of Leibniz. He too argued that the 
body contains a seminal part or core, which he dubbed its ‘flower of substance’: 
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I am of the opinion that every body…has a flower of its substance… This 
flower is so subtle that it even remains in the ashes of incinerated things and 
can, so to speak, draw itself together into an invisible centre… Now I also 
believe that this flower of substance of a human being neither increases nor 
decreases, although its clothing and covering are in constant flux.56 
 
To get a better understanding of Leibniz’s doctrine it is helpful to note at the outset 
that he conceives the majority of matter in a human body as a sort of common or rude 
‘stuff’ through which runs the animal spirits. The animal spirits were considered by 
many in early modern times to be the soul’s instrument or agent in the body, and 
although intermediary between incorporeal soul and corporeal body they are 
themselves very much corporeal, consisting of a subtle form of matter, akin to a thin 
fluid, which originate in the brain and circulate through the nerves of the body. This is 
Leibniz’s view also, though he makes the further claim that within the spirits lies ‘a 
subtler part’.57 This ‘subtler part’ is the flower of substance. If the spirits are a subtle 
form of matter, like a thin fluid, then the even more subtle flower of substance is 
perhaps best conceived as a kind of smoke or vapour running throughout them. 
     Now according to Leibniz, the flower of substance serves as the seat of a person’s 
soul. In fact it is ‘substantially united’ to a person’s soul,58 which itself exists in a 
mathematical point possessing location but no extension.59 During life, this point is to 
be found in ‘the very centre of the brain’,60 although a person’s flower of substance is 
not restricted to this point but instead ‘diffuses itself’ throughout the remaining matter 
of that person’s body.61 Yet despite being corporeal and spread throughout the body, 
the flower of substance is all of a piece, that is, it exists as a single unified thing 
incapable of being divided but capable of contracting itself back into its originating 
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point, which according to Leibniz is what it does when a person dies. When this 
happens the flower of substance will persist unharmed, its indestructibility being 
secured by the fact that it is located in an indivisible point, which makes it impervious 
to fire (‘For who will be able to burn a point?’),62 the activities of cannibals (it ‘cannot 
be diminished by teeth, or dissolved by the acid of the stomach, nor likewise can it be 
converted into nourishment’)63 and anything else that can be thrown at it. So every 
other part of the body may decay, be eaten, or destroyed in some other way, but the 
flower of substance will persist until the time of the resurrection, when it will 
suddenly be in a position to diffuse itself through a greater quantity of matter once 
again. 
     Key to this theory is Leibniz’s belief that the soul contains a kind of blueprint of 
the body within it: ‘the…unity of the body comes from the mind… the idea or essence 
or the body – namely of this body…survives in the mind’.64 Consequently, whenever 
the soul’s instrument, the flower of substance, is diffused through a quantity of matter, 
irrespective of how large or small this quantity may be, it diffuses its identity to it as 
well. Hence the body a person has at birth is, on this theory, the same as the one that 
person has at adulthood, old age, death, and at the resurrection, the identity being 
secured on the continuity of the only essential material part, the flower of substance. 
Leibniz’s idea can be summarized as follows: 
 
RB6. A person’s resurrected body will consist of a ‘flower of substance’, which 
is a subtle form of matter into which the person’s soul is permanently 
implanted, and which remains numerically the same ‘flower of substance’ that 
person’s body had during life, together with a quantity of other matter through 
which the aforementioned flower of substance is diffused. 
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Christia Mercer claims that Leibniz’s doctrine of a flower of substance is ‘enormously 
clever’ for its ability to explain how a human body is able to remain the same while 
undergoing considerable changes.65 It is difficult to disagree with this assessment, and 
its apparent cleverness no doubt explains why different versions of the doctrine were 
put forward by other thinkers. Samuel Clarke, for instance, independently advanced a 
remarkably similar theory, albeit much more tentatively and with much less detail.66 
More notably, from a historical standpoint, in the latter half of the 18th century, 
Charles Bonnet, inspired by Leibniz, claimed that the germ of the body and seat of the 
soul is an indestructible ‘little ethereal machine’ located in the human brain,67 and that 
‘the resurrection will be nothing but the prodigiously accelerated development of this 
germ, presently sealed within the corpus callosum’.68 And in the Jewish midrashic 
tradition we find the doctrine of the luz bone, which holds that the resurrection is to 
be effected from a small almond-shaped bone residing at the base of the spine (or 
nape of the neck, according to some), which is the seat of the soul.69 According to the 
17th-century Rabbi Menasseh Ben Israel, ‘in the spine there is a particular small bone 
which is never destroyed; from that small bone alone, after the destruction and 
annihilation of the other parts of the body, man is restored and brought back’.70 The 
parallels between the luz bone and Leibniz’s flower of substance are many: both are 
considered to be the seat of the soul, and both are considered to be indestructible 
(Menasseh relates the story, found in numerous Jewish commentators, of the failure of 
Emperor Hadrian’s attempts to destroy a luz bone by grinding it, burning it, 
immersing it in water, and finally striking it with a hammer on an anvil).71 Common 
to all such theories, however, is the problem of maintaining the indestructibility of 
whatever part of the body is identified as being the seat of the soul in the face of 
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empirical evidence to the contrary. Léonard Euler, for instance, noted that the head 
did not seem to offer much protection to the ‘little ethereal machine’ Bonnet located 
in the brain, as a blow to the head can lead to memory loss and other psychological 
problems.72 If such damage could occur at a time when the germinal organ was 
supposedly protected by the rest of the brain and the skull, there seemed to be slim 
grounds for thinking that it would be resistant to damage or destruction when such 
protection was lacking, as it would be after death. Arguably the same concern looms 
over other versions of the doctrine behind RB6, such as the luz bone and Leibniz’s 
flower of substance. 
 
Scholasticism 
Leibniz’s doctrine was of course heavily indebted to the Scholastic tradition of 
which he was arguably a part. A more typical proponent of the Scholastic view was 
Kenelm Digby, who endorsed the Scholastic conception of substances as a 
combination of substantial form and matter. Of the latter he had this to say: ‘Matter 
considered singly by it selfe, hath no distinction: All matter is in it selfe the same; we 
must fansie it, as we doe the indigested Chaos, It is an uniformely wild Ocean.’73 So 
according to Digby, in itself it makes no sense to speak of a bit of matter retaining its 
identity over time, because matter is by its very nature undifferentiated. In the idiom 
of the Schools it is just pure potentiality, and only exists insofar as it is organized by a 
form. As Digby explains, a physical body can only be said to retain its identity if the 
substantial form which organizes it remains the same: ‘...that which giveth the 
numerical individuation to a Body, is the substantiall forme. As long as that remaineth 
the same, though the matter be in a continuall fluxe and motion, yet the thing is still 
the same.’74 Human bodies are no exception. For the Scholastics, the substantial form 
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of a human body is the soul, which remains numerically the same soul throughout a 
person’s life and even afterwards, because the soul continues to exist after death, 
albeit in a disembodied state. When God brings about the resurrection, the soul is 
once more joined to a quantity of undifferentiated matter which at that point becomes 
the resurrected body of the person in question. And since that person’s soul has 
remained the same, and since only substances or (in the case of humans) their 
substantial forms can be said to retain identity, the matter organized by that person’s 
soul in her resurrection body is therefore by definition the same matter organized by 
her soul during her normal life. Thus her resurrection and pre-resurrection bodies will 
be the same. Digby nicely illustrates this as follows: 
 
...if God should joyne the Soule of a lately dead man (even whiles his dead 
corps should lie entire in his winding sheete here) unto a Body made of earth 
taken from some mountaine in America; it were most true and certaine that the 
body he should then live by, were the same Identicall body he lived with before 
his Death and late Resurrection. It is evident that sameness, thisnesse, and 
thatnesse, belongeth not to matter by it selfe, (For a generall indifference 
runneth through it all) but onely as it is distinguished and individuated by the 
Forme. Which, in our case, whensoever the same Soule doth, it must be 
understood alwayes to be the same matter and body.75 
 
Thus Digby’s view amounts to this: 
 
RB7. A person’s resurrected body will consist of a quantity of undifferentiated 
matter organized by that person’s soul (substantial form). 
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Contemporary commentators are split on whether RB7 resolves the difficulty of how 
individuals are raised with the same body. While Caroline Walker Bynum calls it ‘an 
elegant solution’,76 Udo Thiel claims that ‘Although authors like Digby subscribe to 
the doctrine of the sameness of the resurrection-body, their position is really a thinly 
veiled version of the view that the identity of the body is not required for the 
restoration of the same self at the resurrection.’77 I think such a gloss fails to capture 
the subtlety of Digby’s position, and in doing so it reveals just how alien Digby’s 
views are to the modern mind, especially on the issue of matter being undifferentiated 
in itself. 
     Despite the apparent success of the Scholastic account in being able to explain 
what it means to be resurrected with the same body, it is interesting to note that it has 
not been historically popular, even among those who devised it! Many Scholastics 
were instead in favour of view expressed by RB1,78 despite the problems involved 
with that. Their reluctance to endorse RB7, which their metaphysics would seem to 
demand, may in part be due to their adherence to the principle that a privatione ad 
habitum non dari regressum (there is no return from privation to possession), the 
upshot of which is that, pace Digby, reintroducing the same substantial form into a 
quantity of undifferentiated matter does not automatically bring about numerically the 
same thing; for that to occur, the thing has to go through the same process of 
generation and corruption it did the first time around. Leibniz notes that their loyalty 
to the aforementioned principle made it difficult for the Scholastics to grasp how the 
same flesh can be returned in the resurrection (which is supposed to be an 
instantaneous rather than lengthy process),79 while more unsympathetic opponents, 
like the Cathars, argued that it ruled out the possibility of resurrection altogether.80 
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     Such concerns with the principle that a privatione ad habitum non dari regressum 
were not, however, responsible for RB7’s lack of popularity in the early modern 
period. For many early modern thinkers the problem lay not with that principle, but 
with the acceptability of RB7’s metaphysical underpinnings. The philosophical 
credibility of hylomorphism, that is, the doctrine that things are composed of matter 
and form, was severely eroded with the advent of the mechanistic worldview ushered 
in by Galileo and Descartes. Crucial to the mechanical philosophy was the rejection of 
substantial forms, and a reconceptualization of matter as extension (that is, something 
which occupies space) rather than pure potentiality. Considered to have great 
explanatory success, the mechanical philosophy became so firmly embedded that, for 
many, it was difficult to see what grounds there could be for repopulating the world 
with substantial forms, even if doing so would allow for elegant solutions to otherwise 
thorny philosophical problems. 
 
Descartes 
And it is to a proponent of the mechanical philosophy – Descartes – that we now 
turn for our final attempt to explain how humans can be said to retain the same body. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Descartes’s view is in essence very similar to that advanced by 
Scholastics such as Digby, though arguably it ought not to have been. On the question 
of the identity of material things, Descartes offers an unambiguous answer: 
 
When we speak in general of a body, we mean a determinate part of matter, a 
part of the quantity of which the universe is composed. In this sense, if the 
smallest amount of that quantity were removed we would eo ipso judge that the 
body was smaller and no longer complete; and if any particle of the matter were 
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changed we would at once think that the body was no longer quite the same, no 
longer numerically the same.81 
 
So for a material thing to retain its identity, it must continue to be composed of the 
very same matter in the very same arrangement. But according to Descartes, such a 
criterion is not applicable in the case of a human body: 
 
But when we speak of the body of a man, we do not mean a determinate part of 
matter with a determinate size; we mean simply the whole of the matter joined 
to the soul of that man. And so, even though that matter changes, and its 
quantity increases or decreases, we still believe that it is the same body, 
numerically the same body, provided that it remains joined in substantial union 
with the same soul.82 
 
Although the above remarks are made in the context of the Eucharist rather than the 
resurrection, they undoubtedly commit Descartes to the following position on the 
latter: 
 
RB8. A person’s resurrected body will consist of the same soul united to a quantity 
of matter. 
 
This is a fair extrapolation from Descartes’s view that sameness of soul guarantees 
sameness of body, for such a principle leaves no scope for Descartes to adopt any 
position on the identity of the resurrection body bar RB8. Its similarity to the 
Scholastic view, encapsulated in RB7, is clear enough, though given Descartes’s 
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understanding of matter as extension rather than potentiality, and the fact that he has a 
clear criterion of identity for material things in general, his claim that sameness of a 
human body hinges on the sameness of its soul has more of an ad hoc feel to it. 
Nevertheless, RB8 is obviously immune to the cannibal problem, as for Descartes it 
will make no difference what (or even how much) matter is united to a soul to form a 
person’s resurrection body; so long as the soul is the same, the body will be so too. As 
such, there are no grounds for disputes over ownership of bodily matter. 
     The ability to sidestep the cannibal problem did not, however, immunize RB8 
against critical attack. Menasseh Ben Israel, for instance, objected: ‘But this opinion 
is completely absurd, because on this view there would be no resurrection, but only a 
transmigration of souls into new and different bodies.’83 Implicit here is the 
assumption that the identity of human bodies is determined independently of whether 
they are united to this or that soul or any soul at all. This assumption was shared by 
many in the early modern period, and ironically it was the undermining of 
Scholasticism by the mechanical philosophy, of which Descartes was a key figure, 
that helped to make this so. Nevertheless, by making this assumption, which 
Descartes did not share, Menasseh reveals himself to be operating from an entirely 
different philosophical perspective, and one more in accord with modern intuitions 
than arguably Descartes’s was. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the early modern period, the belief that humans will experience a bodily 
resurrection has steadily declined in favour of the view that the resurrection will be 
spiritual,84 and as a result less ink has been spilled in attempts to explain how humans 
can be resurrected with the same body. Yet many are still committed to the idea of a 
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bodily resurrection, as well as to the position that humans will be resurrected with the 
same bodies (it being affirmed, for instance, in §§988-1001 of the 1992 Catechism of 
the Roman Catholic church), and, as noted earlier, efforts are still being made to 
determine how this should be understood. While some of these efforts have no 
precursors in early modern thought, others revisit some of the accounts of ‘same 
body’ discussed in this paper.85 Consequently, while the foregoing discussion 
provides an historical context to the efforts of contemporary scholars seeking to 
fashion a defensible account of what it means to be resurrected with the same body, I 
see no reason why it cannot serve another function, namely as a useful resource of 
raw materials for present-day thinkers engaged in that endeavour. Indeed, it would be 
fitting if it was not just problems that one age of philosophy bequeaths to another, but 
the means to resolve them as well.86 
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